future:
The UEFI secure boot protocol is part of recent UEFI specification releases. 
It permits one or more signing keys to be installed into a system firmware. 
Once enabled, secure boot prevents executables or drivers from being loaded 
unless they're signed by one of these keys. Another set of keys (Pkek) 
permits communication between an OS and the firmware. An OS with a Pkek 
matching that installed in the firmware may add additional keys to the 
whitelist. Alternatively, it may add keys to a blacklist. Binaries signed 
with a blacklisted key will not load.
There is no centralised signing authority for these UEFI keys. If a vendor 
key is installed on a machine, the only way to get code signed with that key 
is to get the vendor to perform the signing. A machine may have several keys 
installed, but if you are unable to get any of them to sign your binary then 
it won't be installable.
This impacts both software and hardware vendors. An OS vendor cannot boot 
their software on a system unless it's signed with a key that's included in 
the system firmware. A hardware vendor cannot run their hardware inside the 
EFI environment unless their drivers are signed with a key that's included 
in the system firmware. If you install a new graphics card that either has 
unsigned drivers, or drivers that are signed with a key that's not in your 
system firmware, you'll get no graphics support in the firmware.
Microsoft requires that machines conforming to the Windows 8 logo program 
and running a client version of Windows 8 ship with secure boot enabled. The 
two alternatives here are for Windows to be signed with a Microsoft key and 
for the public part of that key to be included with all systems, or 
alternatively for each OEM to include their own key and sign the 
pre-installed versions of Windows. The second approach would make it 
impossible to run boxed copies of Windows on Windows logo hardware, and also 
impossible to install new versions of Windows unless your OEM provided a new 
signed copy. The former seems more likely.
A system that ships with only OEM and Microsoft keys will not boot a generic 
copy of Linux.
Now, obviously, we could provide signed versions of Linux. This poses 
several problems. Firstly, we'd need a non-GPL bootloader. Grub 2 is 
released under the GPLv3, which explicitly requires that we provide the 
signing keys. Grub is under GPLv2 which lacks the explicit requirement for 
keys, but it could be argued that the requirement for the scripts used to 
control compilation includes that. It's a grey area, and exploiting it would 
be a pretty good show of bad faith. Secondly, in the near future the design 
of the kernel will mean that the kernel itself is part of the bootloader. 
This means that kernels will also have to be signed. Making it impossible 
for users or developers to build their own kernels is not practical. 
Finally, if we self-sign, it's still necessary to get our keys included by 
ever OEM.
There's no indication that Microsoft will prevent vendors from providing 
firmware support for disabling this feature and running unsigned code. 
However, experience indicates that many firmware vendors and OEMs are 
interested in providing only the minimum of firmware functionality required 
for their market. It's almost certainly the case that some systems will ship 
with the option of disabling this. Equally, it's almost certainly the case 
that some systems won't.
It's probably not worth panicking yet. But it is worth being concerned.
